Policies increasing the number of disaster medical volunteers with a sense of mission
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17811/ebl.6.4.2017.125-132Abstract
This study presents an economic analysis of policies designed to increase the number of healthcare workers with a sense of mission as disaster medical volunteers, who play critically important roles during or immediately after natural disasters. I apply a cultural transmission model to ascertain how changes occur in the ratios of healthcare workers motivated by a sense of mission and healthcare workers motivated by economic incentives. As a result, increasing subsidies to hospitals that deploy medical volunteers to disasters increases the number of healthcare workers motivated by economic incentives. Therefore, I show that increasing the ethical standards of healthcare workers while decreasing subsidies to hospitals could increase the number of healthcare workers motivated by a sense of mission.
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