Tax policy cyclicality and financial development

Authors

  • Christos Chrysanthakopoulos Department of Economics, University of Patras, Greece; Economic Research Division, Alpha Bank, Greece
  • Athanasios Tagkalakis Department of Economics, University of Patras, Greece; Economic Analysis and Research Department, Bank of Greece; Hellenic Parliamentary Budget Office; Hellenic Open University.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17811/ebl.13.1.2024.48-57

Keywords:

Tax policy, Financial Development, Time-varying, political variables, fiscal institutions

Abstract

This paper adds to the existing literature by examining the macroeconomic, political and institutional determinants of tax policy cyclicality conditional on financial development. We find that an increase in trade and financial openness leads to pro-cyclical VAT and counter-cyclical CIT rate response in high financially developed economies, while an increase in financial openness is associated with counter-cyclical VAT and PIT responses when the levels of financial development are low. A high public debt ratio leads to a counter-cyclical VAT rate response in economies with low financial development. Political power and fiscal institutions are factors that affect the tax policy cyclicality only in less financially developed economies.

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Published

20-01-2024

How to Cite

Chrysanthakopoulos, C., & Tagkalakis, A. (2024). Tax policy cyclicality and financial development. Economics and Business Letters, 13(1), 48–57. https://doi.org/10.17811/ebl.13.1.2024.48-57

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Articles