Ownership structure and profit maximization in general equilibrium models of monopolistic competition

Autores/as

  • Vincent Boitier Le Mans University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17811/ebl.12.1.2023.85-90

Palabras clave:

Methodological issues, monopolistic competition, , ownership structure

Resumen

Using Hart (1979, 1985) and Mas-Colell (1984), I defend the idea that the standard ownership structure is somewhat problematic in general equilibrium models of monopolistic competition because profit maximization is not a justified objective of the firm. I then advocate that a solution to overcome this methodological issue is when ownership is disproportionally concentrated among households.

Citas

Nothing to declare

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Publicado

2023-03-26

Cómo citar

Boitier, V. (2023). Ownership structure and profit maximization in general equilibrium models of monopolistic competition. Economics and Business Letters, 12(1), 85–90. https://doi.org/10.17811/ebl.12.1.2023.85-90

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